

RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE EAST.

VI.

MISTRUST OF TURKS BUT AN ALLIANCE.

DANGER TO RUSSIA OF UNITED ISLAM.

By Arthur Ransome.

REVAL, JULY 9.

The external facts of the Russo-Turkish Alliance are well enough known. The relative position of the two partners seems, however, to have been very generally misunderstood. From the point of view of the future, the most interesting ingredient in that alliance is one of mutual mistrust. The Russians were, of course, pleased by the Turkish rejection of a treaty to which neither the Turkish nor Russian revolution had been a party. They were pleased to find new difficulties in the way of their enemies' settlement of the world, and their general policy in the East inclined them to help the growth of those difficulties. On the other hand, a strong "bourgeois" Turkey would threaten Russian revolutionary interests as well as European economic interests. There was always the danger that such a Turkey might be bought by Europe for use against Russia, and this idea, as I shall presently show, is by no means banished from the Russian mind.

The Turks, though afraid of Russian Communist propaganda, were, as the weaker party, at first the more eager to come to an agreement. The Angoran Assembly looked upon Russia as their only possible ally, and were extremely anxious to free themselves from the danger of large-scale hostilities on their eastern front in order to oppose a stronger front to the various foreign troops operating in what they considered to be Turkish territory in the west. Agreement of some kind was forced upon Turk and Russian by the position of the Armenian and Georgian Governments, which threatened them both with foreign intervention. Batum was a base available for use against either Russia or Turkey. Armenia "Great" on paper was almost a promise that it would be so used. Both the Georgian and Armenian Governments were bitterly anti-Communist, and the Armenian Government of Dashnaks (a political party) was for very good reason bitterly anti-Turk as well, and, unfortunately for it, was set upon extending its territory so as to include a considerable Mussulman population.

Here, of course, were obvious reasons at least for local agreement between Turks and Russians, even in spite of their mutual distrust. This distrust touched even the Armenian question, for Moscow, though hostile to the Armenian Government, desired a Sovietised Armenia, and had no sort of wish to see the Turks marching into Erivan. Feelers were put out from the Turkish side with the object of at least preventing Russo-Turkish hostilities, and presently the Turkish and Communist armies were acting in accord. The accord was not general, but the Turks evidently had had orders from Angora to do nothing to jeopardise the hoped-for alliance. I will give a single example. In July, 1920, the Armenian Government sent an ultimatum signed by Reuben Ter Minasian (I think the Minister of War) demanding recognition of

acteristic way. In notes which are models of literary ingenuity they echoed the rhythm and refrain of the notes that were issued from Moscow. They were tireless in insisting that the Anatolian movement was a movement of the "workers and peasants of Turkey." Some of their chief spokesmen expressed their belief that the "victory of Bolshevism," not in Turkey of course, but in Western Europe, was the only thing that could save the Turkish people from enslavement. Further, they said, in Turkey capital was foreign, and consequently Turkey in fighting the Sevres Peace and the regime of Capitulations was engaged like Russia in a struggle against world capital, and therefore deserved the fullest support. What they asked for was an understanding in the East and military equipment for use in the West. They got the one, and it is extremely probable that in one way or other they received a good deal of material supplied originally by the Western Powers, material of which Denikin and Wrangel had had the temporary use.

They would have got both a great deal sooner if it had not been for the still uneradicated mistrust of the Russians. The Russians seem to have been better informed than the Allies about the position of Turkey's centre of gravity, or perhaps, as an experienced revolutionary Government, they were psychologically better able to make true deductions from their information. They had no doubt that the real force to be reckoned with in Turkey was that of the Angoran Government. They made the mistake, however, of attributing the same perspicacity to the Allies, oddly under-estimating the material influences which by making the reality of Constantinople desirable to the Allies tended to make it credible. Assuming that the Allies, like themselves, realised that Angora was Turkey, and seeing that the Allies did not seem to care much what happened to Armenia, they thought that the Allies would make friends with Angora, give the Turks a free hand in the Southern Caucasus, and with Turkish aid make a general attack on Russia's connections with Central Asia, repaying themselves for the expenses of such action by the seizure of Baku. The Angoran Government would make its way to respectability over the corpses of Russian Communists and would probably get nominal control of Batum.

Some of the leading Communists are still convinced that the alliance with Turkey is a frail thing, and that reconciliation between Angora and the Entente will be accomplished on these lines. Pavlovitch, for example, declares that "England is preparing a front against us from Asia Minor, through North-east Persia, the Bokharan Mountains, where the Bokharan Emir has taken refuge, the Pamirs, Fergan, and Afghanistan." Of this imaginary front Angora is an essential part.

Turkey and the Allies.

On the other hand were those who urged that "every revolutionary movement in the East begins in Turkey," and that here was the beginning of that conflagration which would burn the houses of their enemies to the ground. If only they could be sure that Angora could not be bought! And there was a party of Communists who, reasoning on lines which could not but appeal to Marxists, assured Moscow that it had nothing to fear, since the material interests involved were such that agreement between Angora and the Allies was out of the question. Of these Communists, Skatchko put in an admirably argued report, beginning with a brief analysis of the Sevres Peace. He makes a list of Turkey's prospective losses and concludes: "For Turkey remains only the central part of Asia Minor, deprived of its biggest commercial towns, deprived of all exits to the Mediterranean, deprived of its best Black Sea ports, Trebizond and Sanguladak, and deprived of the Beaded

DOCTORS AND DIAGNO

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(From a Medical Correspondent.

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE, TUESDAY.

The annual meeting of the British Medical Association was formally opened to-day regards its general and scientific and side. All its activities, scientific and political, are most comfortably and adequately housed in the Armstrong Club and the College of Medicine, and the arrangements for the reception and accommodation of visitors have been made by the eastern Branch of the Association on a scale that leaves nothing to be desired the way of comfort.

The representative meeting has now completed its labours. Yesterday and they have been principally busied with discussion on the burning question of management and finance of hospitals. Divergent views were expressed and a number of resolutions were passed, some of which amounted to this—that the voluntary system should be retained; that Government subsidies should be obtained without Government control; and that no financial assistance should be accepted from municipalities. It was considered that such assistance inevitably lead to municipal control.

After his installation as President Clifford Allbutt, Professor David Drummond read his presidential address, taking the title "The Medical Profession: A History of Hope." The address was especially interesting and valuable, as it was characterised by a frankness of criticism that is often lacking in ceremonial orations of this sort. There are certain things which always be said about the nobility of the medical profession and so forth and things Professor Drummond duly said. He made it refreshingly clear that such a thing was an ideal to be aimed at and its attainment must depend on the outlook, the conduct and the aspirations of the individual composing the profession. We gathered from his utterances that nobility was something that was not necessarily conferred by degree.

We must, he said, ask ourselves whether we were satisfied with things as they are and if not in what manner they could be improved, whether we were satisfied with the position our profession occupied in the scheme of national policy, and if we were satisfied with ourselves. With regard to the status of the profession, he quoted Professor Ford's recent book entitled "A New Chapter in the Science of Government," in which the following passage occurs:—"The medical profession of the country in various groups is now in progress of organizing itself into a vast guild of a new political kind, which later will embrace the whole world, and why? Because we have become convinced that the whole hygiene of the folk requires its utmost consideration in all its aspects, and it is determined to be represented adequately in the government of the country."

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It was evident, Dr. Drummond continued, that the medical profession was becoming an indispensable factor in the government of the country, essential to the well-being of the nation to be encouraged and fostered as one of the great national assets. During the last few years there had been a gain all along the line, and the advance quite as marked in the social and medical world as in the strictly scientific. It was their aim, more wholeheartedly than any other time in the past, to bring the medical profession into closer harmony with the public, and it was only fair to recall that the public was now more discriminatingly than ever in the habit of thinking, a change that he welcomed, for they looked to the assistance in their efforts to advance the public. "Can we do more than we are doing now? Can we do greater services and thus deserve still more the goodwill and approval of our fellows? If so, we shall have to complain of our position in the world. We shall recognise our true value, the custom, others will esteem us as we esteem ourselves," said Dr. Drummond.

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He was listened to, yet the very words of that last hopeful sentence of his strike a note of mistrust of a quite different kind. And if the old fear of a Turkish understanding with the Allies is fading away (Angora's refusal to ratify Bekir Sami's unauthorised compromise with France contributed to remove it) this new fear is daily growing. What if the Turkish nationalist movement is successful and, covering its aims by friendly professions, extends its influence beyond the mountains of the Caucasus, beyond the Caspian, over the cotton fields of Turkestan, up the Volga, and into the Urals? The Russians would be glad enough to play godfather to a gigantic Moslem movement which would be dangerous to the Allies, but they have no wish to suffer from it themselves. And day by day, as they were moving, readily enough, towards the alliance with Turkey, the curtain was lifting on the stakes of that gamble. For the moment, valuable Turkish help throughout Mohammedan Russia and in the neighbouring countries of the East from a movement which seemed risen as if by miracle to carry out for them their Eastern policy. But afterwards, supposing that the social revolution should miss its cue, and Russia be faced not by an ally turned Communist but by a United Islam which by a single word spoken at evening from a minaret could halve the area of Russia during the night?

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"Can we do more than we are doing now? Can we progress more rapidly? Can we render greater services and thus deserve a still more the goodwill and appreciation of our fellows? If so, we shall have no complaint of our position in the State, we shall recognize our true value, and the custom, others will esteem us as we esteem ourselves," said Dr. Drummond.

There were inequalities in the medical service, Dr. Drummond continued, which rendered the service to the public defective. A doctor was more important than his title, and it should be their duty to train a man so that he would fulfil his responsibilities towards his patients and the State could not make character, but the State should shape it; but he was afraid there were many who looked upon the profession as a means to a living. As matters were, the State would soon realize the great utility on every medical man, and anxious that it should not be left to the profession to bring it home to them. Conscious of the advantages of discerning criticism, he acknowledged that progress might be made and indulge in a dream of medical idealism.

The Profession's Difficulties

Dealing with the difficulties of the profession, Dr. Drummond observed that the very high estimate entertained of the doctor's position was his undoing, for he was set tasks which he could not perform, and was expected to build bricks without straw. "In urging the profession for greater facilities for post-mortem examination in clearing up doubts which must be in the mind of the doctor in many cases," "I am indicating the most important step towards a rational scheme of post-mortem training. It is perhaps unnecessary to point upon the enormous advantage it would be to have post-mortem examinations universal, save those who never make them, are not to admit their educational value, and a little doubt that the opposition to a new system in this direction, begotten of prejudicial public mind, would soon vanish were a calculable service to the science of medicine made sufficiently clear. I regret to admit that the advance along certain paths is not as rapid as we could wish, but not nearly so rapid as it would be were post-mortem examinations more frequent. I believe I am stating what is correct and

ness of cattle at market prices. Further, within six weeks, they were to hand over \$1,000,000 pounds of rye, of which half was to be paid for at a fixed price and half be given gratis. Each house was to give up one rifle, in all not less than 7,000 rifles, with 80 cartridges per rifle, also all guns, machine-guns, and other munitions of war. The handing over was to begin within 48 hours of acceptance of the ultimatum and to end within 15 days. All troops were to hand over their arms on the first day. Hostages, two from every village and three from each town, were to be taken to Erivan until disarmament was complete.

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Making-Up to Russia.

Angora, of course, was not equipped with any such long-distance policy as that involved in the Communist attitude towards the East. I doubt whether, even to-day, it goes so far in its plans as the handful of pan-Turanian enthusiasts who are at this moment exploiting the Russo-Turkish alliance with the most decided views as to an eventual parting of the ways when Islam shall be strong enough to stand by itself. The men of Angora were faced with immediate problems. They wanted their rear guaranteed by a friendly Power. And they sorely needed shells and cartridges. With these two limited objects they set about making up to Russia. They did it in a char-

acter which would have made the Allies without suicide. But what if the Allies alter the terms? Skatchko believes that this is impossible. Too much is involved. None of the Allies will give up its share except upon a mutual basis, and some will refuse to give up anything. He thinks that Mesopotamia is the key to the situation. No wholesale revision of the treaty is possible while England holds Mesopotamia, and "it is more than enough to read in the English newspapers of the significance of Mesopotamia for England—to hear that triumphal licking of lips—to understand that English Imperialism will not let this tit-bit slip from its mouth." And if England is to have Mesopotamia, she must give France Syria, Greece Smyrna, and so on and so on. Therefore the struggle between the Turks who have signed the National Pact and the Entente is one to the death, and Moscow can safely become intimate with Angora. Further, until the end of the struggle with Western Europe, the Turkish influence will support in the Caucasian races a feeling friendly to Soviet Russia. And, "since the end of that struggle will be the victory of world social revolution, there will be no need to worry about any kind of national influence."

He was listened to, yet the very words of that last hopeful sentence of his strike a note of mistrust of a quite different kind. And if the old fear of a Turkish understanding with the Allies is fading away (Angora's refusal to ratify Bekir Sami's unauthorised compromise with France contributed to remove it) this new fear is daily growing. What if the Turkish nationalist movement is successful and, covering its aims by friendly professions, extends its influence beyond the mountains of the Caucasus, beyond the Caspian, over the cotton fields of Turkestan, up the Volga, and into the Urals? The Russians would be glad enough to play godfather to a gigantic Moslem movement which would be dangerous to the Allies, but they have no wish to suffer from it themselves. And day by day, as they were moving, readily enough, towards the alliance with Turkey, the curtain was lifting on the stakes of that gamble. For the moment, valuable Turkish help throughout Mohammedan Russia and in the neighbouring countries of the East from a movement which seemed risen as if by miracle to carry out for them their Eastern policy. But afterwards, supposing that the social revolution should miss its cue, and Russia be faced not by an ally turned Communist but by a United Islam which by a single word spoken at evening from a minaret could halve the area of Russia during the night?

UNIVERSITY INTELLIGENCE.

CAMBRIDGE, JULY 19.

At King's College the Reginald John Smith Studentship is awarded to J. Dexter, B.A., first-class natural science student specialising in chemistry, who came up from Deacons School, Peterborough. The Harold Fry Studentship is awarded to F. T. Jackson, B.A., a Wrangler in the recent Mathematical Tripos, who came up from Christ's Hospital. The Augustus Austen Leigh Studentship is awarded to A. P. D. Penrose, who passed the English Tripos last year.

FARROW'S BANK DEPOSITORS' ASSOCIATION.

The hearing was resumed at Edmonton County Court yesterday before Judge Crawford of the case in which members of the London Association of Depositors and Current Account Holders in Farrow's Bank, Limited, are suing George Walter Eayres and William Meads, both of Clapham High Road, for the accounts of the Association. They are also applying for the confirmation of an interim injunction restraining the defendants from advertising or holding themselves out as officers of the Association, and in particular from receiving or handling subscriptions or other moneys on behalf of the Association. It is alleged that the defendants refused to give up the books and banking account.

The case was adjourned until September 23, when a complete discovery of the books shall have been made.

advance quite as marked in the socio-medical world as in the strictly scientific was their aim, more whole-heartedly than any other time in the past, to bring the value into closer harmony with the value, and it was only fair to recognize the public was now more discriminatingly the outlook of the bystander who what he thought but what he felt, but people had acquired the, at times, incon- habit of thinking, a change that the pro- welcomed, for they looked to the pub- assistance in their efforts to advance.

"Can we do more than we are doing a progress more rapidly? Can we render greater services and thus deserve an still more the goodwill and appreciation our fellows? If so, we shall have no to complain of our position in the Sta- we shall recognise our true value, and the custom, others will esteem us as we ourselves," said Dr. Drummond.

There were inequalities in the medic- vice, Dr. Drummond continued, which dered the service to the public defective doctor was more important than his and it should be their duty to train and him so that he would fulfil his propen- sions towards his patients and the State. could not make character, but they shape it; but he was afraid there were many who looked upon the profession a means to a living. As matters were the State would soon realise the great re- sibility on every medical man, and I anxious that it should not be left to th- to bring it home to them. Conscious advantages of discerning criticism, let acknowledge that progress might be ha- and indulge in a dream of consti- idealism.

The Profession's Difficulties.

Dealing with the difficulties of the pro- Dr. Drummond observed that the very lo- of the estimate entertained of the doct- his undoing, for he was set tasks wh- could not perform, and was expected to bricks without straw. "In urging the ne- for greater facilities for post-mortem in- in clearing up doubts which must a- the mind of the doctor in many cases," I "I am indicating the most importan- towards a rational scheme of post-gr- training. It is perhaps unnecessary to upon the enormous advantage it would b- post-mortem examinations universal, f- save those who never make them, are p- to admit their educational value, and little doubt that the opposition to a mo- in this direction, begotten of prejudic- public mind, would soon vanish were calculable service to the science of m- made sufficiently clear. I regret to h- admit that the advance along certain di- tic paths is not as rapid as we could w- not nearly so rapid as it would be were mortem examinations more frequent; believe I am stating what is correct whe- that in private practice they are not e- frequent as they were in my earlier days.

"It is true that in a few of our large ho- throughout the country, in the wards of students of medicine enjoy the inest- privilege of clinical study, the enlighten- nittee of management now sanction- autopsy in every case under fitting limit- but in the majority of our clinical hospit- old restrictions still obtain, and the st- pathology is still hampered as of old- great disadvantage of the medical scho- if they but knew, to the public themselves.

Did anyone question the service rende- diagnosis by the substitution of the unc- prospect of certainty for the atmosphere- certainty let him ask what he had learne- the modern surgeon's exploratory open- and he would candidly admit that ne- he knew of abdominal diagnosis was th- come of the ease and impunity with wh- could now "open and see." For the fa- for natural progress and ever-ripeni- perience which he would like every pract- to be able to claim as a right, he ha- doubt sooner or later the State would- provision in the interests of medical scien- the health of the nation.

Rule of Thumb Guides.

"Of what value," continued Dr. Drum- "are the statistics upon which the com- officials of our insurance companies are- to base certain actuarial stati- which are accepted as guides to p- because they are founded upon statisti- piled from official returns, which we- reason to believe are so hopelessly ina-