

THE GREAT POWERS, GREECE AND TURKEY AND THE ARMISTICE OF MUDANYA, OCTOBER 1922 THE FATE OF THE GREEK MAJORITY IN EASTERN THRACE

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Mudanya was of critical importance to Greece. Imposed upon Athens by the Great Powers and Turkey, its acceptance would inevitably exact a heavy toll, the extirpation of the three millennia presence of Hellenism in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace and the acceptance of the staggering burden of absorbing over 1.3 million destitute refugees into a society ill-equipped to care for them. Indeed, Mudanya was perhaps the last opportunity available to Greece to hold or modify the movement toward a cruel, massive and involuntary population exchange. A firm stand on the Eastern Thrace question by Greece during the Mudanya armistice talks or, at the least, a refusal to evacuate the region until after the Lausanne Peace Conference, would have undoubtedly strengthen the Greek position during the peace negotiations at Lausanne. It may have prevented the mass exodus of over 300,000 Greeks from their ancestral homes in Eastern Thrace, whether or not the region had remained under Greek or Turkish sovereignty. At the very least, it would have allowed for a more orderly and humane transfer of Eastern Thrace's Christian population to Greece. Why this did not happen is a primary focus of this study.

The Road to Mudanya

The sudden and unexpected route of the Greek army in Anatolia in August 1922 led to the joint intervention of Britain, France and Italy whose own interests were also at risk. Ostensibly their mediation was based on a September 2 note of the Greek Government asking London to arrange for an armistice on the basis of an immediate evacuation of Asia Minor, its army no longer being capable of coping with the enemy offensive. But the Greek request was silent on the question of Eastern Thrace. While prepared to evacuate Asia Minor, Greece was not prepared to give up Eastern Thrace, which had a Greek Christian majority population and where militarily it enjoyed a strategic advantage. Greek forces had liberated and occupied much of the area in 1919.²

It should be noted that since March 1922 the Greek Government was prepared to evacuate all of Asia Minor, provided the Allies would guarantee the lives of its Christian population. A Turkish guarantee alone was in its view no guarantee at all. The Allies refused. At the time, however, the Allies in their effort to revise the Sèvres treaty in Turkey's favour proposed *inter alia* that all of Eastern Thrace be demilitarised, and that a portion of Eastern Thrace be returned by Greece to Turkey to provide a sufficient distance from Constantinople to assuage Turkish fears for the security of the city. Adrianople was to remain Greek.³ At this juncture the Turkish Nationalists were not interested, the proposals were unacceptable, and they employed delaying tactics to give sufficient time for military preparations to overcome the increasingly vulnerable Greek forces.⁴

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With victory in Asia Minor assured, Kemal informed the Allies on September 5, *inter alia*, that Thrace should be restored unconditionally to its frontier of 1914, within two weeks of the armistice. Thus, with little enthusiasm, the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople proposed to Kemal that on September 9 they enter negotiations for an armistice. However, the meeting did not materialize.⁵ On that day the Turkish army occupied Smyrna [Izmir],⁶ from which the battered remains of the Greek army were earlier evacuated by waiting ships. And by mid-September the withdrawal of the Greek army from Anatolia was complete, when the Greek Third Army Corps in the north, retreating in an orderly fashion to the port of Panderma on the Sea of Marmara, crossed over into Thrace.

With the shield of the Greek army smashed, nothing but a few disunited British, French and Italian troops stood between a victorious Turkish army and its return to Europe. Flushed with victory, Kemal moved his forces north, towards the Straits, with the objective of taking Thrace, including Constantinople and Adrianople, the frontiers demanded by the Turkish National Pact, by force of arms, if necessary.⁷ Military victory at once placed the Turks in an advantageous if not dominant bargaining position, not only with Greece but the Allies as well, whose shares of the spoils of the Ottoman peace treaty of Sèvres (1920) had been assured by the presence of the Greek military in Anatolia.⁸

Shocked by the magnitude of the Turkish victory and alarmed at the vulnerability of their own interests, the Allies drew together. On September 10, at a meeting of the Allies in Constantinople, the British G.O.C. General Sir Charles Harington asked his French and Italian colleagues, if they would send token detachments to reinforce British forces making a front in the Ismit [Ismid] peninsula and at Chanak [Çanakkale] on the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles. They willingly agreed to do so, and on the following day the three Allies notified Kemal's representative in Constantinople that Turkish forces must not transgress the Neutral Zone.⁹ And on the 14th, at the request of British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, French Premier H. Poincaré asked Kemal on behalf of the Allies not to violate the zone of the Straits, in other words not to cross over into Eastern Thrace. However he softened his request by adding that "such an action would not prejudice the conditions of peace on which our [French pro-Turkish] sentiments are known".¹⁰

On the following day, fortified by the resemblance of Allied cooperation and alerted by reports from Constantinople that, if the situation were allowed to drift, Kemal was likely to force the issue and attempt to cross the Straits, the British Cabinet met in urgent session. It decided to adopt military measures necessary to restrain the Turks at the Straits, until arrangements could be made for a peace conference. Reinforcements were sent to Chanak.¹¹ On the 16th, Churchill, who until then favoured the pro-Turkish group in the Cabinet, emerged for combat. He drew up a statement of the Cabinet's policy on the Turkish question of the previous day and with Prime Minister Lloyd George's approval, publicly announced it. Foreshadowing a possible war with Turkey, the communiqué, the so-called manifesto of September 16, was not well received by Britain's allies, with the exception of course of Greece.¹² The French Government was profoundly troubled that London did not confer with it before making its grave initiatives public. While in accord with the necessity of preserving the freedom of the Straits, it differed on the proper means to realize this goal and accused the British Government of undermining French efforts to bring the Turks to the peace table.

The rupture with France was almost complete. On September 17, General Pellé, the French High Commissioner, left Constantinople to meet with Kemal, without informing his British and Italian colleagues. On the 18th, in Smyrna, he assured Kemal that France did not associate itself with the British manifesto, but asked him to respect the Neutral Zone, in return for promises of support at the peace conference. Kemal's response was that although he was prepared to attend a peace conference, he could not restrain his troops until Eastern Thrace was "liberated"; and that he must finish the campaign before the onset of winter, even if it meant war with Britain. Delay would be fatal.¹³ Meanwhile, on the following day in Paris, France and Italy in a joint communiqué declared that they would not go to war against Turkey, disassociated themselves from the war hysteria in

London and announced, contrary to the wishes of Britain, that they were prepared to concede in advance of the peace conference the territorial claims of the Turkish National Pact, including the retrocession of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa frontier with Adrianople, and Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, when neutralized. They also withdrew their token detachments at Ismit and Chanak, leaving the British troops alone to face the Turk's advance.¹⁴

At this point Lord Curzon hurried to Paris to repair the damage caused by Churchill's Manifesto but also at the same time to reproach Poincaré for the desertion of French troops at Chanak. After a long and acrimonious dispute at the Quai d'Orsay, a conference on the Greek-Turkish armistice was resumed. In these discussions, the basic disagreement with Poincaré and the Italian representative, Count Sforza, was above all Eastern Thrace. Poincaré, in support of the Turkish demands, wanted to transfer Eastern Thrace immediately to Turkey, including Adrianople. Curzon wished to deal with it in accordance with Paris, March 1922 proposals at the pending peace conference, while allowing the Allied Generals and Kemal to work out stop lines for the respective military forces. Finally however, despite a considerable effort to hold firm in Eastern Thrace, Curzon reluctantly gave way. On September 23, the Allied representatives, in a joint note to the Nationalist Government, drafted by Curzon, again called for a peace conference on the affairs of the Near East, mainly at the expense of Greece. At the insistence of the French, the joint note indicated *inter alia* that the Turkish desire for the restitution of Thrace up to the Maritsa [Evros] river, including Adrianople, would be taken into consideration at the peace conference; the condition was that the Nationalists would not send troops into the Neutral Zone of the Straits, which also become Turkish with suitable demilitarization safeguards. The note invited Kemal to attend a meeting at Mudanya, on the Sea of Marmara, to arrange with the Allied Military Chiefs an armistice between Greece and victorious Turks and lines of demarcation, beyond which the Turks should not advance. This was to be followed by a conference in Venice or elsewhere to decide the conditions of peace between the Allies, Greece and Turkey.¹⁵

On the same day began the Chanak crisis, which almost led to war between Britain and Turkey. Turkish troops had advanced against British lines and the British were determined not to retreat, but to call up additional reinforcements into Chanak, whose defense had now become a matter of pride and prestige of a Great Power.¹⁶ When on the 28th and 29th it was reported that the Turks were collecting in considerable numbers around the British perimeter and the situation was becoming increasingly dangerous, the Cabinet authorized General Harington to issue an ultimatum to the Turks: "if you do not withdraw from the Neutral Zone around Chanak, you will be fired upon"¹⁷. And for the next two days the Cabinet "waited breathless to know whether the guns had gone off, or whether the Turks had withdrawn"¹⁸

It should be noted that the militants in the Cabinet, including Lloyd George and Churchill, dreaded that Kemal would accept the September 23 invitation to an armistice, because it would compel Britain to implement the condition of handing over Eastern Thrace to the Turks. Thus, Britain would lose credit with the Greeks, without gaining that of the Turks, as France and Italy will claim that they forced Britain to do it.¹⁹ In any case, by the end of the month a war at Chanak was averted. Kemal finally accepted the call for an armistice at Mudanya and Turkish forces withdrew from the British barbed wire at Chanak.

Earlier, on September 27, Poincaré decided to use his personal influence to restrain Kemal by sending to him an « unofficial emissary » in the person of Franklin-Bouillon. This ubiquitous Frenchman and avid Turcophile, was instrumental in concluding for France an important agreement with Turkey on October 20, 1921, commonly known as the Franklin-Bouillon agreement. It provided *inter alia* for the evacuation of the French army from Cilicia or SE Anatolia in return for certain economic concessions. It enabled Kemal to withdraw his forces from the Armenian and Syrian fronts and fling them against the Greeks. This agreement was signed in secret, without the knowledge of France's ally Britain and, as could be expected, created much bitterness between them.²⁰ Franklin-Bouillon left for Smyrna aboard a French warship on September 28, pathetically eager to be the hero and to stop all chances of war by yielding to the Turks. According to Poincaré

and the French media, it took Franklin-Bouillon two days of hard negotiations to convince Kemal to hold back his troops and to send General Ismet [Inönü] to meet with the Allied Generals at Mudanya. But they chose to ignore the fact that he had exceeded his authority by assuring Kemal that all of his demands would be met and Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa river be immediately evacuated by the Greeks and turned over to Turkey. In his anxiety to be seen as a peacemaker, Franklin Bouillon had offered the Turks more than Britain and perhaps even France were prepared to give.²¹ The British naturally did not appreciate Poincaré's bargaining with Kemal behind their backs and came thoroughly to dislike this intrusive emissary, who preached that peace was only possible by giving in to the Turks.²²

In fact Kemal did not need to be convinced by Franklin-Bouillon to accept the September 23 invitation to parley. His military posturing and the delay in agreeing to meet with the Allied Generals were largely due to his need to placate the extremist in his own camp who, carried away by their victories, were eager to push into Eastern Thrace and even to recover Western Thrace as far as Serres in Eastern Macedonia. He also wanted to test the Allied resolve and to improve his military position before going to Mudanya. In the end Kemal overruled the majority of his generals and ministers, who wished to push on into the Balkans because there was nothing to be gained by attacking the British, who were beyond bluffing and clearly determined to fight, even without allies. Kemal realized that only a major military operation could possibly dislodge the British from a strategically unimportant Chanak and that war or a further delay in the armistice talks would also give the Greek army time to reorganize and reinforce its defenses in Eastern Thrace. In any case, why fight a war that you could lose, if you have already been promised Constantinople and the Straits without firing a shot and if you have the assurance of French and Italian support at Mudanya.

Revolt in Athens

The decision of the Allied Governments in Paris to cede Eastern Thrace to Turkey in their September 23 note to Ankara was not solely the result of Greece's defeat in Anatolia and the state of dissolution of much of its army. It was also the consequence of the political vacuum in Athens where military defeat brought about the collapse of the Gounaris/Stratos Government and the inability of King Constantine to find someone to put together an effective ministry. However, the political void in Greece did not last long, and the Allies, in their effort to reach an understanding with Turkey, were soon to encounter a defiant Greece. On September 24 the remnants of the Greek army in Chios and Mytilini revolted. And within three days, the Revolution under Colonels Plastiras and Gonatas reached Athens, forced the King to abdicate and appointed a new Government. Initially, the goal of the new Greek regime was to reorganize the army and to reinforce its defense of Eastern Thrace. Indeed, the Revolution and the expulsion of King Constantine were, in part, precipitated by the Allied invitation to negotiate peace on the basis of Turkey receiving Eastern Thrace. In fact, the new regime believed that with King Constantine gone, the Allies would favor the retention of Eastern Thrace by Greece. While this was wishful thinking as far as Italy and France were concerned, it was not the case with Britain. Indeed, the moment Lloyd George read the news of the Greek King's abdication, "he bitterly regretted the [Paris] decision as regards Eastern Thrace"²³ While he could not support King Constantine on September 23, the new Greek Government was another matter. Still, the decision was made and Britain felt honor bound to it, unless and until it was modified by a further Allied decision, or the outbreak of hostilities.²⁴ Nevertheless, in its confrontation with the Turks, it was no secret that the new Greek factor was crucial in British military planning and that it revived Greek hopes of meaningful support from that quarter. Undoubtedly, it also precipitated Kemal's orders to his troops to advance on Chanak by reviving Turkish fears that Lloyd George and Venizelos might again throw the Greeks into the field or at least press for a settlement more favorable to Athens.²⁵

However, the Revolutionary Regime had now to face the extraordinary problems of the previous regime, both external and internal. As a result of almost a decade of war and of the humiliating defeat in Asia Minor, the demoralized Greek army was in a state of dissolution and the economy on the verge of collapse. To make matters worse, the carnage of Smyrna had heralded a

mass exodus of the Greek Christian population from Anatolia. In a matter of 2-3 weeks in September over 500,000 destitute and traumatized refugees were dumped like cattle in Greece, despairing and clamoring for immediate assistance simply to survive.²⁶

"The conditions of these people upon their arrival in Greece was pitiable beyond description...If ever the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, rode down upon a nation, it was when this appalling host appeared upon the shores of Greece, that was trampled by the flying hoofs of their chargers and scourged by the spectral riders of War, Famine, Pestilence and Death."

The condition and the state of mind of the returning soldiers and of the incoming refugees clearly had the potential for explosive social conflict. The Revolution was also under pressure, particularly from the army, to try and convict those responsible for the Asia Minor debacle, which would further add to the deep schism between royalists and anti-royalists.

In external affairs, the Revolution had to deal with a victorious and threatening Turkey. reach an armistice agreement and prepare for the peace negotiations at Lausanne. Kemal was now not only master of Asia Minor but was also threatening to move into Thrace and beyond. And this at a time when Greece was internationally isolated. Indeed, since December 1920, all Allied help had been withdrawn and official and public opinion in Britain and France had been totally estranged by the restoration of King Constantine because of his anti-Entente behaviour during World War I. Moreover, the Revolutionary Government was not recognized and Greece's erstwhile allies, although clearly divided, were united in reaching an agreement with Kemal, mainly at Greek expense, to protect their own interests in the Middle East and in the Straits. As far as they were concerned, Greece had no choice but to follow their dictates, "Greece must bow to the decree of the Powers".²⁷

Under enormous pressure, the Revolutionary Government saw that its most immediate needs and priorities were to attend to the relief of the refugees and to reorganize its demoralized military forces into an effective instrument in order to obtain at least some leverage in the forthcoming armistice and peace conferences. To supplement the five divisions in Thrace, the Revolutionary Government retained four classes of conscripts, 1919-1922, confirmed the summons already given to the 1923 class and recalled two more classes older than 1919; planned to re-group 2-3 divisions and send them to Thrace with an independent division. This would give them 8 to 9 divisions in all of Thrace or approximately 100,000 men. However, it would take several weeks for the plan to be implemented and Greece did not have the time.²⁸

Recognizing its own inexperience in foreign affairs, one of the first acts of the Revolutionary Government was also to invite Venizelos (September 27), who was then in Paris, to represent Greece abroad with full powers to deal with foreign policy questions. The former Prime Minister of Greece immediately accepted.²⁹

The Allied Powers and Turkey at Mudanya

The negotiations at Mudanya are best described as ten tense days of hard bargaining and brinkmanship, without much optimism for success. I may add that an anomaly at the conference was that the Greek delegation did not participate directly in the negotiations, but were informed of the proceedings of the meetings by the Allied Generals aboard Allied warships in the harbor of Mudanya. Their participation will be discussed separately later.³⁰

The actual talks were held in the former Russian Consulate, a small shabby house with limited space and poor lighting. There was only room at the conference table for the heads of the four delegations, British, French, Italian and Turkish, with interpreters in between. Moreover, the only lodging available in the town were some mosquito-ridden hospices, compelling the Allied generals to sleep on board their warships off shore.

Although the negotiations were complex, the main issue, not surprisingly, was Eastern Thrace. Curzon had made it clear to the Allied generals and High Commissioners that the sole object of the generals at Mudanya was to fix the line of retirement of Greek forces in Eastern Thrace, in accord with the Greek and Turkish military authorities. In return for this Allied intervention, the Kemalists would undertake not to send troops into the Neutral Zone and not to cross the Straits before and during the final peace conference. The provisional administration in Eastern Thrace was one to be decided by the Allied Governments and not by the generals at Mudanya, who were instructed not to make political decisions. In any case, and until after the peace conference, the interim administration of Eastern Thrace would be controlled by Allied officers. And Greek forces would only withdraw to the agreed upon line of retirement, when the Turks withdrew entirely from the Neutral Zone and *satisfactory arrangements had been made for the preservation of order and the protection of minorities of whatever nationality in the evacuated areas.* (Italics added).³¹

However, the program presented by the Allied generals on October 4, within the limits of their instructions, was completely unacceptable to the Turks, who tried to get them to discuss political questions in anticipation of the final peace settlement. Indeed, the Nationalists, with strong encouragement of the French, were clearly not in a mood to compromise. Their reply to the Allied proposals, which was that all Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople and Karaağaç, be evacuated within 30 days and restored completely to Turkish sovereignty before the entry into force of the final peace treaty, led to a dead lock. The main stumbling block in the negotiations was the Turkish formula that the stay of the Allied control commissions and the Allied troops in Eastern Thrace would be limited to the period of the Greek evacuation of no more than fifteen days. As soon as the evacuation takes place, the territory would be progressively consigned to the Kemalists, which would within fifteen days take possession with all rights of full sovereignty of the entire administration of the Region, without any administration by the Allies. The Allied control commissions would retire immediately after the installation of the Turkish administration.

On October 5, after heated discussions with the Turks, the Allied generals drafted a protocol with significant concessions to the Turkish position, and asked for Ismet's approval. But at the last minute, the head of the Turkish delegation abruptly changed course and demanded that all of Eastern Thrace be turned over to the Nationalists immediately and that not only the Greek army, but also the Allied officers, missions and contingents in Eastern Thrace be withdrawn at once. He threatened that if his demands were not accepted within 24 hours, his troops would resume the advance and attack Chanak.³²

While the French General Charpy, under orders from Franklin Bouillon, was prepared to accept the Turkish demands for the immediate session of Eastern Thrace, Harington and the Italian General Mombelli were not. I should add that throughout the negotiations Bouillon flitted between Generals Ismet and Charpy, urging the former to resist and the later to surrender. Harington was particularly disturbed by the haughty attitude and intransigent position of the Turkish delegation that considered "Eastern Thrace as already theirs and that there should be no foreign interference in this matter. The line they take is that they intend to have Eastern Thrace and that, if they do not get it peacefully and soon, they will continue military operations at once." Harington complained that Franklin-Bouillon was encouraging Turkish pretensions and described him as a perfect curse. The British High Commissioner Rumbold concurred and characterized the French attitude "as treacherous surrender inspired by Franklin Bouillon."³³

The rupture in the negotiations was ostensibly due to the Turkish insistence that the promises made to Kemal by Bouillon at Smyrna to get him to stop the advance of his troops to enter into armistice talks must be honored; whereas Britain and Italy did not consider themselves to be bound by them, since they did not authorize him to make such promises. The impasse prompted Kemal to bitterly complain to the French that "I have lost 15 days because I had confidence in you"

³⁴ The Turkish demands were also made in reaction to what they perceived to be vague Allied

promises, to the continuous British military build-up at Chanak and to the reorganization and expansion of Greek forces in Thrace. They were also Kemal's response to mounting pressure from his officers and the Grand National Assembly to move immediately on Thrace. He felt a particular burden of great responsibility for agreeing, in the first place, to participate in the Mudanya conference without the consent of the later. On balance, however, Kemal's belligerent threats were clearly part of a calculated strategy of brinkmanship that was to prove highly successful.

Meanwhile, having been apprised of the threatening situation and of the division in the Allied camp, Curzon once again crossed the Channel to confront the French. From 11 p.m. on October 6 until the early hours of the following morning, he remained closeted with Poincaré, who insisted on concessions to the Turks. The most Curzon could secure from him was a face saving agreement by which the Greeks would withdraw to the line West of the Maritsa river within fifteen days and Eastern Thrace would be occupied by Allied detachments for a maximum of thirty days after the beginning of the Greek withdrawal, instead of the fifteen days generals Charpy and Mombelli conceded to the Turks. And this pathetic concession was made, only after Curzon threatened not to send Harington back to Mudanya and to defend the Straits from Turkish incursions, with or without French support.³⁵ It was also agreed that the number of Turkish gendarmes allowed in Eastern Thrace would be limited and that the validity of the military convention or armistice would depend on Turkish respect for the Neutral Zone as defined by a successful Anglo-Turkish agreement. On October 7, a general formula for a final military convention was approved and Curzon instructed Harington to resume negotiations, but there were to be no further concessions. On this understanding, Poincaré telegraphed Charpy ordering him to support Harington in insisting on the terms of the agreement.³⁶ At last, on the evening of October 9, the Allied generals submitted a final draft of their proposals to Ismet, in conformity to the formula sent to them from Paris. The four-page document provided that the hostilities between Greece and Turkey cease; Greek troops were to withdraw to the west bank of the Maritsa river within 15 days; Greek civil authority was to be turned over to a Turkish administration within 30 days after the Greek withdrawal, with an inter-Allied mission to supervise in the interim; and no more than 8,000 Turkish gendarmes were to be stationed in Eastern Thrace before the treaty of peace was signed. Turkish troops were to keep out of the Neutral Zones, Constantinople and Eastern Thrace until the conclusion of a treaty of peace.³⁷

Once again, when the conference reassembled, Ismet moved toward the brink and refused to sign the protocol, objecting to most of its provisions. Despite the fact, thanks to the French and the Italians, that they knew that Harington had orders to issue a counter ultimatum, if the military convention was declined and to prepare for battle.³⁸ Finally, in the early hours of October 11, Ismet pacing up and down in that awfully dark room, relented. Mindful of his instructions from Kemal to press the British, but not to the point of risking a rupture, he suddenly agreed to sign the convention, taking effect as from midnight October 14/15, 1922.³⁹

The Greek Response

The September 23 invitation to Kemal for armistice talks at Mudanya was prepared and delivered without consultation with the Greek Government. Yet it was apparent that whatever agreements were reached at Mudanya would require the consent of the new Revolutionary Government in Athens, whose leadership had declared "the Turks had won in Asia Minor but not in Thrace. If they want it, let them come and fight for it."⁴⁰

On October 2, Colonel Plastiras visited the office of the British Minister in Athens and asked Lindley, if it was true that on the next day the Allied generals would be meeting at Mudanya. He also informed the British Minister that he was going to Thrace to try to reform the army there and that he hoped to field an effective force of 60,000 men in its defense if necessary. In the course of their conversation Lindley, who had not yet received official confirmation of the armistice talks, advised Plastiras that if Kemal accepted the Allied invitation to a conference, it would be madness for the Greeks to refuse to attend. Greece, he explained would need Allies after the long war and

could not hope for their assistance to put its house in order, unless it accepted the decision of the Great Powers. He added that the lessons of the last two years were that Greece could do nothing in the long run if isolated and that if Greece refuse to attend the conference and continued the war with Turkey against the wishes of the Great Powers, the result would be a true catastrophe. At this point Plastiras admitted the force of Lindley's counsel and responded that he would do what Venizelos advised on this matter but that he must lose no time in getting the army in shape in Thrace. Lindley concurred that a disciplined and efficient force on the Maritsa was indispensable for Greece because "one never knew how far Kemal's success might have gone to his head".⁴¹

Also on October 2, Venizelos met with Curzon at the Foreign Office and was told that the purpose of Mudanya was to draw a line behind which the Greek army would be to withdraw in Thrace and to prepare an inter-Allied occupation in Eastern Thrace pending the conclusion of a peace conference. Venizelos replied that he realized that Eastern Thrace was lost for Greece, but declined to consider the possibility of the Greek army being withdrawn until the peace conference had given its final judgment. He argued passionately for the necessity of the Greek military to remain in Eastern Thrace, in order to secure the protection of its Greek inhabitants and to give Greece some leverage to defend its remaining interests, when the peace conference assembled. How otherwise, he asked, would his government be in a position to retain Western Thrace and to resist Turkish demands for indemnity, which it could not afford, and thus be forced to surrender to Turkey the Greek fleet. Curzon's response was that Britain would work hard for the retention of Western Thrace by Greece and that indeed by staying in Eastern Thrace, Greece would jeopardize her position in Western Thrace and elsewhere. He warned Venizelos that it would lead to immediate Turkish military action for which Greece was not yet prepared. He reasoned that by agreeing to withdraw from Eastern Thrace, Greece would have time, before and during the peace conference, to develop its military posture in Western Thrace. Two days later Venizelos returned to London and informed Curzon that he had advised the Greek Government to accept the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Eastern Thrace, provided that there were guarantees for the Christian population in the form of an Allied occupation pending the conclusion of a peace conference.⁴²

Meanwhile, late in the evening of October 2, General Mazarakis was appointed Greek representative to the Mudanya conference, with instructions to seek a simple rectification of the line currently held by the Greek troops in Thrace. If demands were made for a major pullback in Thrace, he was to declare lack of authority on the matter and ask Athens for further instructions. He was to absolutely reject demands that Greece not reinforce her military forces in Thrace, or that Greece undertake a complete evacuation of Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa river.⁴³

On the morning of October 4, just as Mazarakis was prepared to sail for Mudanya, the Greek Government received a dispatch from Venizelos reiterating the need to hold on to the Eastern Thrace until the peace conference, but adding that Greece could not afford to remain isolated and that it should comply, if she is asked by the Powers to give up Eastern Thrace. If the Government's policy, he wrote, were to keep Eastern Thrace against the wishes of the Powers, he would decline the offer of representing his country abroad.

Mazarakis arrived in Mudanya late in the evening of October 4, where the conference had started the day before without the Greek delegation. And it was not until the morning of the next day on the 5th that Mazarakis and Sariyannis had their first meeting with the Allied generals.⁴⁴ And not surprising, in accordance with his instructions, Mazarakis refused to accept the decision of the Allies for the evacuation of Eastern Thrace, explaining that he came to Mudanya to discuss an armistice and not to surrender Eastern Thrace to the Turks, which was a political matter to be taken up at the forthcoming peace conference. Needless to say, the Allied generals were deeply disturbed by the Greek position. They feared, not without reason, that the Turks would refuse to accept the validity of the conference, if the Athens Government did not immediately adhere to its decisions. The French particularly strongly condemned the Greek position. Charpy asserted that Eastern Thrace will be given to the Turks, and that this cession was definite and irrevocable. The Greeks, he

told Mazarakis, "better understand the situation and accept it because they lost the war and they had to pay."⁴⁵

In the meantime, as we have seen, the conference had reached a dangerous impasse over the Kemalist demands for a full and immediate possession by Turkey of Eastern Thrace. The crisis had hastened a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers in Paris, where they were assured by Venizelos that Greece would withdraw from Eastern Thrace provided that the area remain under Allied administration for the protection of the Greek population until the conclusion of the peace conference. Without such protection, Curzon had argued, the Greek population, mindful of the Turkish atrocities in Asia Minor, would leave under difficult circumstances. And in this case he asked who would feed and care for them? Poincaré retorted that the protection of minorities was of small relative importance and that if the Turks advanced into Eastern Thrace, he would do nothing to stop them. The Turks, he declared, might get excited in Asia, but in Europe they would behave themselves.⁴⁶ Curzon's plea on behalf of Venizelos had fallen on deaf ears and the most he could extract from the French was the extension from 15 to 30 days of Allied control of Eastern Thrace, hardly enough to perform the task of making orderly arrangements for the anticipated departure of the Greek civilian population and the installation of the Turkish authorities.

On October 10 Mazarakis informed Athens of the tense situation at Mudanya, as described earlier in this paper, and asked for new instructions. He recommended that Greece reject the terms of the armistice, complaining that none of the core Greek proposals had been inserted into the convention. Neither those concerning the withdrawal of the Greek troops to the former Bulgarian frontier in Thrace of 1915, nor those of amnesty and the prolongation of the Allied administration to insure the orderly and safe withdrawal of an apprehensive Greek civilian population.⁴⁷

After Ismet accepted the Armistice terms in the early hours of October 11, all eyes turned toward the Greeks. Would they sign? Harrington had received word from London that they would and so informed his colleagues. Thus at noon Mazarakis was invited aboard a British warship for the signing ceremony, but to the dismay and consternation of the Allies, he refused to sign the armistice convention in the absence of full instructions from his Government and repeated his objections of the previous day.⁴⁸ It is interesting to know that as a result of his refusal to sign, there is no Greek signature on the official armistice convention signed at Mudanya, although it does contain a Greek signature block and, of course, the signatures of the other participants.⁴⁹

Mazarakis left Mudanya and arrived in Athens on October 13 to explain his reasons for not signing the convention, based on the confusion and the contradictory nature of his instructions. His explanation may have been an excuse not to affix his name to a document, which he considered humiliating and unfair to Greece. When he was first asked to accept the assignment to Mudanya, he had refused on the grounds that "it was very difficult for me to present myself as a defeated party at a place where I had been a victorious party. In my opinion, it was more just to have a royalist officer go there."⁵⁰

Meanwhile, on October 12 Venizelos received an urgent telegram from Athens, informing him that Greece had not signed the convention, and asking him to advise the Government, whether it should do so. He immediately went to the British Foreign Office to learn of the substance of the convention, and after lengthy discussions with Curzon and Crowe, it was apparent that he was particularly alarmed by the provision that contrary to his understanding with Curzon in Paris, Turkish authority was to be restored as the Greek troops withdrew and not 30 days after the completion of the withdrawal. He expressed his misgivings that the Allies had not inserted contingency plans in the convention, if it were found impossible to complete that withdrawal of the civil population, or that part of it, which wished to leave within the stipulated 30 days. Without a contingency plan for the extension of the period of Allied occupation and control, he expressed his fear that the civil population would be exposed to the danger of either complete annihilation, if it stayed, or of a sudden route, as was the case in the Smyrna region, where the refugees took flight, leaving every possession behind them, in order to save their lives.⁵¹ On the following day, after

having received an official copy of the text signed in Mudanya from the Foreign Office, Venizelos dispatched a letter to Curzon, expressing his misgivings of the armistice convention and his fears for the safety of the Christian population of Eastern Thrace. Their tragic situation, he wrote, was further increased by the failure of the Allies to compel the Turks to give amnesty to those, who thinking themselves to be Greek citizens for the past two years, either served in the Greek army, or collaborated with the Greek administration. They will now be prosecuted, he complained for high treason, as already happened in Smyrna, and will be hanged.⁵² Nevertheless, following the advice of his British mentors, who sought to assure him that one way or the other the civil population would be protected, Venizelos cabled Athens that it was in Greece's interest to sign the convention.⁵³

On October 13, a reluctant Greek leadership officially accepted the terms of the armistice and instructed Simopoulos, the High Commissioner of Greece in Constantinople, to address a declaration to the Allied High Commissioners and to the Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly signifying Greece's acceptance of the Mudanya convention. The text of the declaration read as follows:

*"The Greek Government considers that its declaration by the Greek delegates at Mudanya should have been taken into consideration, especially regarding guarantees and formulas strictly necessary for the safety of the lives and property of the Christian population of Eastern Thrace. The Greek Government makes a final appeal to the sentiments of humanity of the Allied Powers, in favor of these populations. Desiring, nevertheless, to conform to the decisions of the Powers, the Greek Government sees itself obliged to submit and declare its adherence to the armistice protocol signed at Mudanya."*⁵⁴

The Mudanya Armistice in Perspective

Although the Turkish Nationalists did not achieve their maximum demands, they were, by far, the chief beneficiaries of the armistice. They compelled the Allies to meet on Nationalist-held territory and to treat them as the only official government of Turkey, signifying the end of the Ottoman Government in Allied-controlled Constantinople. Without war, they pressed the Allies to abandon their hold on Turkey, obtained Eastern Thrace, deemed essential by them for the return of Constantinople, and secured the eventual orderly Allied withdrawal from that city upon the condition of a Near East peace. Moreover, the agreement to vacate Constantinople emboldened the Nationalists within a few days after Mudanya and before the opening of the Lausanne peace conference to undermine the Allied occupation machinery and to force a dual *de facto* regime in Constantinople—an Allied military regime and a Turkish civil one.⁵⁵ In addition, at Turkish insistence, the question of minorities and amnesty were left outside of the scope of the armistice, thus provoking, from the Turkish perspective, the welcome ethnic cleansing or mass exodus of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace and a sizeable portion of the Greek population of Constantinople.

Turkish diplomacy was also driven by the deeply held belief that if the Allies did not yield to Turkish demands at Mudanya, they were less likely to do so at the peace conference. The Kemalists were clearly distrustful of the vagueness of Allied promises and wary of Britain's decision to refuse them Constantinople until the final peace conference, although as we have seen, France and Italy were prepared to turn over Constantinople immediately. They were convinced that even after Mudanya, Britain would strive to maintain her position and the straits at their expense.⁵⁶ Indeed, two days after the signing of the armistice, in an interview with the Turkish press, Ismet declared: "It is only when they respect all the engagements and promises made that we can say that we have been successful. We do not consider our mission as complete. Our armies are ready in case we do not obtain our rights."⁵⁷

The success of the Nationalists at Mudanya was largely due to their measured but firm diplomatic stance and their willingness, if necessary, to employ their advantageous military position for the achievement of their goals. Success at Mudanya also insured for them the promise of a similar triumph in the forthcoming peace conference at Lausanne. The one major disappointment for

them at Mudanya was their inability to extract an Allied pledge to hold a plebiscite in Western Thrace, as outlined in the National Pact. The Nationalists attributed this failure to the absence of a Turkish army in Eastern Thrace, due to British resolve, and to the growing power of the reorganized Greek army along the Western bank of the Maritsa.⁵⁸

France and Italy also considered their participation at Mudanya a success; and in terms of Great Power rivalry they took some satisfaction in Britain's put down by the Kemalists. Their support of the Nationalists and indifference, if not outright hostility, to Britain's client, Greece, came as no surprise. Long before Mudanya, in 1921, the French and Italians acknowledged the realities of Turkish Nationalism and decided to cut their losses in Cilicia and Antalya [Adalia] respectively; provided weapons and aid to the Kemalists in the 1919-1922 Greek-Turkish war and in return, secured promises of extensive economic concessions. France's pro-Turkish policy, however, was chiefly inspired by the urgency to acquire a satisfactory demarcation of the Turkish border with French mandated Syria and to be at liberty to deal with the unruly Arabs in Damascus. On the other hand, their experience at Mudanya convinced them that the Turks "will cease to be our friends the day when the last concession is refused them."⁵⁹ It was this experience that contributed to the French mending of the fences with Britain at Lausanne.

Unlike Italy and France, the British leadership, for reasons of national prestige and to some extent her sense of obligation to Greece and concern for the Christian population of Eastern Thrace was extremely reluctant to accept the notion that abandoning the pawn constituted by Eastern Thrace was preferable to open hostilities. This was remarkable given the severe restraint on British diplomacy. France and Italy had categorically refused to join in a more forceful policy in regard to Turkey and indeed were prepared to allow the Turks to cross over into Europe before the peace conference; Her coalition government was on the verge of collapse and British public opinion was clearly opposed to the renewal of hostilities; and the reconstitution of the Greek army in Thrace was an uncertain factor. Moreover, Britain found herself with only 16 battalions facing 200,000 Turks. Nevertheless, Britain's achievements at Mudanya were not inconsiderable. By her determined stand at Mudanya, Britain gained a few critical weeks of breathing space before the opening of the peace conference, which allowed her to secure Allied unity and to shape the direction of negotiations at Lausanne. Moreover, her success in maintaining the Allied military presence in Constantinople and keeping the Turkish army out of Eastern Thrace strengthened the Allied negotiating position at Lausanne and prevented the renewal of a Greek Turkish war. The military struggle for Thrace would have probably initiated a Third Balkan War with all of its deleterious consequences. Also, Britain's refusal to vacate Constantinople until after the peace conference undoubtedly prevented the ethnic cleansing or mass exodus of its substantial Greek community of some 400,000 souls in 1922, including Greeks, who had recently fled from the carnage of Anatolia, although in fact many did leave during and particularly after Mudanya. From October to December 1922 some 50,000 Greeks left Constantinople, under pressure from the illegal Turkish civil authorities, which had infiltrated the city.⁶⁰ But in Eastern Thrace, it was another story. In spite of British efforts, the Allies at Mudanya failed to guarantee the life and property of the region's Christian population and to extend the period of the Allied control commissions beyond the thirty-day period. The result of this failure was over 300,000 panic stricken refugees for Greece. Mudanya was probably the catalyst that obliged the Allies and particularly Britain, to seek a solution to the awesome refugee problem of Greece for which they were, or felt partly responsible.⁶¹

For Greece, Mudanya simply confirmed her status as a defeated nation. Given her precarious internal situation and the military posture of the Kemalists, the country seemed to have little choice, but to accept the enormous sacrifices demanded of her by her erstwhile Allies. Although her military leadership was prone to take a stand in Eastern Thrace, and thus renew the war against Turkey, Venizelos had at once accepted the burden of defeat in order to gain Allied diplomatic support at the forthcoming peace conference and their economic support in the task of reconstruction and refugee settlement. The situation naturally would have been different, if Greece had a significant military force in Eastern Thrace, capable of holding its own against the Turks, or if Britain and Turkey in their acts of brinkmanship had fallen over the brink. I may add here that

British brinkmanship just before and during Mudanya was largely responsible for the downfall of Lloyd George's wartime coalition government on October 19, 1922; whereas, Turkish brinkmanship contributed to the consolidation of power by the Kemalist regime. Even Venizelos would have accepted a war with Turkey in Europe, which involved the Allies, especially Britain, but not without their support. Yet, a rational calculation might have led Greece to refuse to evacuate Eastern Thrace, at least until after the peace conference, in order to ensure the rights and welfare of its Greek population.

Venizelos, who along with the Allies got Greece into Asia Minor in 1919 (if he had not, Eastern Thrace would have probably remained Greek), performed perhaps one of his finest and most difficult acts by refusing to represent the interests of the Greek Revolutionary Government abroad, unless it considered to surrender Eastern Thrace up to the Maritsa river. *"In doing so, he deliberately forbore to embarrass the Allies at a moment, when any Greek had a right to feel bitter against each and all of them. And resisted the temptation of precipitating ... a new Turco-British war, in which Greece might have had a gambler's chance of retrieving ... all or a portion of Eastern Thrace."*⁶² Yet, clearly Venizelos' reluctant acceptance of the Mudanya terms did gain for Greece time to reorganize her army into an effective force in Thrace, as well as Allied support for the retention of Western Thrace at Lausanne.

While his policy to surrender Eastern Thrace was ultimately to Greece's interest, it also clearly served the immediate interests of Britain. Yet, there will always be a lingering doubt. One cannot help but wonder, whether or not the welfare of the Greeks of Eastern Thrace would have been better served had Venizelos adamantly refused to support the armistice convention without a clause for amnesty and without a clause for the retention of the Allied control commissions in the area, until a peace had been signed.

The real victims at Mudanya were the tens of thousands of panic-stricken Christians, who upon hearing that the Turks were coming, abandoned their homes and fields and fled to a refugee burden Greece. As soon as they saw the Greek troops striking camp, within hours hundreds of villages were deserted. To the first wave of what was by now 800,000 pitiful refugees from Anatolia was added a new torrent of wretched, numbed Greeks from Eastern Thrace.⁶³ Ernest Hemingway, then a young reporter for this city's *Toronto Daily Star*, described the abject misery of the scene:

*"...the Christian population ... is jamming the roads...The main column crossing the Maritsa at Adrianople is twenty miles long. Twenty miles of carts drawn by cows, bullock and muddy-flanked water buffaloes, with exhausted, staggering men, women and children... walking blindly along the rain beside their worldly goods... they can keep their places in the ghastly procession... It is a silent procession. Nobody even grunts. It is all they can do to keep moving."*⁶⁴

Under the circumstances, the loss of Eastern Thrace was probably inescapable, but the sudden and pitiful plight of its Christian population was not. If the Allies had insisted that the period of Allied control and occupation be prolonged until July 1923, that is with the conclusion of the Lausanne settlement, as they had for Constantinople, a good portion of the Greek population would have remained. Or, at the very least, if the period of Allied control for all Eastern Thrace had been extended for a month or two and not progressively consigned to the Kemalist authorities, the departure of the civilian population would have taken place under more hospitable circumstances. In any case, the refusal of the Allies to respond to this humanitarian concern at Mudanya would lead them, on the day the armistice convention took effect, October 14-15, 1922, to formally invite the League of Nations to take all possible steps to reach an agreement as soon as possible regarding the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey.⁶⁵

Mazarakis, the Greek representative at Mudanya, was opposed to the Mudanya convention and refused to sign it precisely because it did not provide adequate security for the civilian population of Eastern Thrace. It can be argued that Greece should have held out for appropriate protection of the Christians of Eastern Thrace before committing herself to the convention. One, of

course, does not know what the outcome of such an action would have been. Would the Turks have risked their gains at Mudanya and continued the war? After all they had accepted the conditions for the continued Allied occupation and administration of Constantinople until a peace had been signed. It is ironic that by insisting on the immediate take over of Eastern Thrace as the Greek army withdrew and thus precipitating the movement of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace into Western Thrace, the Kemalists lost any chance of getting the Allies to agree on a plebiscite in Western Thrace with its substantial Muslim population, or if an election had been held of obtaining a favourable outcome. Both Lord Curzon and Venizelos were in agreement that by encouraging the Greek population of Eastern Thrace to resettle in Western Thrace, Greece would be assured of demographic dominance in the region, which would serve as a bulwark against Turkish demands and Bulgarian irredentism.⁶⁶

Without a doubt Mudanya was the decisive factor, which prompted Venizelos to seek a population exchange between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, on the very day, October 13, 1922, that he pleaded with Curzon for the safety of the Greek population of Eastern Thrace and advised Athens to accept the verdict of Mudanya, on that same day he sent a telegram to Dr. Fridjof Nansen, the newly installed League of Nations High Commissioner for refugees, requesting him to endeavour to arrange an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey before the signing of the peace, foreseeing the long diplomatic negotiations at Lausanne. Interestingly, Venizelos' telegram was dispatched before the arrival of Nansen's letter of October 10 from Constantinople, which independently recommended the settlement of the refugees from Turkey on vacant lands in Macedonia and Western Thrace with the help of foreign loans and international relief organizations. He further vaguely suggested a Greek-Turkish population exchange to make room for well over a million refugees in Greece.⁶⁷ And three days later, on October 16, in response from a note from E. Kanellopoulos, the Greek Foreign Minister, asking Venizelos "should the Government discourage the Greeks from Eastern Thrace from abandoning their homes and fleeing to Greece?"⁶⁸ Venizelos replied:⁶⁹

"I think that the Government would be committing a grave crime, if it did not help the population of Eastern Thrace that wished to emigrate. Of course, if it were possible to secure their life and property until the conclusion of peace, we would be in a better position at the peace conference. But it is absolutely certain that after thirty days, with the removal of all allied controls on the Turkish administration in Thrace, the Turks will plunder the movable property of our fellow countrymen and will expel them naked and miserable. Remember what happened on the eve of the Great War. Today, this will be repeated on a much wider scale, because of the contempt the Turks have of the Great Powers. For this reason, it is necessary to facilitate in every way the departure of our fellow countrymen, taking with them their movable property, before the [Turkish] army comes... Do not be deceived. Eastern Thrace is lost forever for Hellenism. The Turks will not tolerate a compact foreign [Greek] population at the very gates of their capital "

Footnotes

- ² The Allies awarded the region to Greece, along with the Greek populated Smyrna district on August 10, 1920 (treaty of Sevres) See Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question, The Last Phase* (Thessaloniki, 1968), 39-41 and 45-46.
- ³ Foreign Office, Miscellaneous No. 3 (1922), *Pronouncement by the Three Allied Ministers for Foreign Affairs respecting the Near Eastern Situation*, Paris, March 27, 1922. {Cmd.1641} (London :HMSO, 1922)
- ⁴ Kemal sent his trusted friend Fethi Okyar on a mission to London in August 1922, whose objective, in part, was « to deceive the British and Greeks into thinking that we are still trying to reach an agreement with them. » On August 16 Kemal told him to stay in London and continue to gain time for the counter-offensive. Osman Okyar, « Turko-British relations in the Inter-War Period : Fethi Okyar's Mission to London » in William Hale and Ali Ihsan Bagis, editors, *Four Centuries of Turko-British Relations, Studies in Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Affairs* (North Humberside, 1984) 62-79.
- ⁵ Kemal Atatürk, *A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal, October 1927* (Leipsig, 1929) 567. Hereafter cited as *The Speech*. Rumbold had reported that the Allied Generals in Constantinople believed that the Nationalists would not agree to an armistice, which did not call for the withdrawal of all Greek troops from Eastern Thrace. Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39*, First Series, Vol. XVIII : *Greece and Turkey*, September 3, 1922 – July 24, 1923. Edited by W.N. Medlocot, Douglas Dakin and M.E. Lambert. (London : HMSO, 1972) hereafter cited as DBFP, Doc. 16. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office) September 8, 1922.
- ⁶ As more and more Turkish troops entered the undefended city, terror spread among its Greek and Armenian population. For days the streets were hideous with screams, murder, rape and pillage. The situation worsened when on September 13 fire broke out. Within days two thirds of the city, primarily its Christian quarters, lay blackened and smouldering. See Marjorie Housepian, *Smyrna 1922 : The Destruction of a City* (London, 1972); George Horton, *The Blight of Asia... with the true story of the Burning of Smyrna* (Indianapolis, 1926) and Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Foreign Office Memorandum on the Smyrna Events*, October 10, 1922, FO371/7955/E11040.
- ⁷ The Turkish National Pact or *Misak-i Milli*, declared by the Nationalists on January 28, 1920 called for *inter alia* the restoration of Eastern Thrace to Turkey and for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, which would determine the region's political future. For events leading to the Turkish National Pact see Roderic H. Davison, « *Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne* », edited by Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert in *The Diplomats, 1919-1939* (Princeton, 1953) 172-181. For the complete text see Elliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey* (New York, 1924), Doc.18.
- ⁸ Psomiades, op. cit., 29-31

⁹ Briton Cooper Busch, *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923* (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1976), 343; Sir Neville Henderson, *Waters under the Bridges* (London, 1945), 109; Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis: The Aftermath*, Vol. 5 (London, 1929), 422; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 20. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 10, 1922; and *The Times* (London), September 12, 1922. The Neutral Zone was the Allied ring around Constantinople from the lines of Chataldja in the west to the Ismir peninsula in the east, from the Black Sea in the north to the Straits of the Dardanelles in the south.

¹⁰ Jules Laroche, *Au Quai d'Orsay avec Briand et Poincaré, 1913-1926* (Paris, 1957), 162; General Ali Fuad Cebesoy, *Siyasî hatıraları [Political Memoirs]* (Istanbul, 1957), 74-75; *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 41. *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, held at the Quai d'Orsay, September 20, 1922; and Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925* (London, 1934), 271.

¹¹ *DBFP*, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 27. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 15, 1922 and Doc. 32. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), September 16, 1922; Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 271 and Stephen W. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets*, Vol. II, 1919-1931 (London, 1972), 283-284.

¹² Psomiades, *Thrace and the Armistice of Mudanya, October 3-11, 1922*, 217-219. While Greece welcomed the British manifesto, its support alone would create, it was believed, serious problems for Britain both at home and abroad. There was strong feeling against being tied to Greece and acting against France. See Roskill, *op.cit.*, 289.

¹³ *The Speech*, 528; and *DBFP*, Doc 41. *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council and the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*, held at the Quai d'Orsay, September 20, 1922. The Turkish response to the Manifesto of September 16 was to reconfirm Russian support in the event of war and to strive for an understanding with Bulgaria for joint action in Thrace. They also sought to encourage the Serbs to make common cause with them and to seize Thessaloniki. See Salahi Ramsden Sonyel, *Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923* (London, 1975), 174-175.

¹⁴ *DBFP*, Doc. 25 & 36, Hardinge (Paris) and Curzon (Foreign Office), September 19, 1922; Busch, *op.cit.*, 346-348; Earl of Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, Vol. 3 (London, 1929), 302-305; and Davison, *op.cit.*, 197-198.

¹⁵ Lord Riddell, *Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After* (London, 1933), 389; Lord Harding, *Old Diplomacy* (London, 1947), 272-73; *The Speech*, 569; Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, 75-76; and *DBFP*, Doc. 42, 48 and 50-51, *British Secretary's Notes of a Conference between the French President of the Council, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Italian Ambassador in Paris*, held at the Quai d'Orsay, September 20, 1922, September 22, 1922 and September 23, 1922, respectively

¹⁶ For a detailed account of the Chanak affair see D. Walker, *The Chanak Affair* (London, 1969), 198-280 and Psomiades, *op.cit.* 221-224; *DBFP*, Doc. 57 & 58, Hardinge (Paris) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 26, 1922; Riddle, *op.cit.* 387-388; and Churchill, *op.cit.*, 431-432.

¹⁷ *BDFP*, Doc. 78. Curzon (London) to Hardinge (Paris), September 30, 1922.

¹⁸ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 290.

¹⁹ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 290.

²⁰ For the text of the agreement see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, Vol 54 (1926-1927), 177-193.

²¹ Kemal Atatürk, *Atatürk'ün söylev ve demeçleri [Collected Speeches]* Volume II (Ankara, 1945), 466-467; Tevfik Bıyıklıoğlu, *Trakya 'da millî mücadele [The National Struggle in Thrace]*, Vol 1 (Ankara, 1955), 470; *Oriente Moderno*, II:5 (October 15, 1922), 278-281.

²² Henderson, *op.cit.*, 109.

²³ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 289. See also *DBFP*, Doc. 85. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 1, 1922.

²⁴ *BDFP*, Doc. 86. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 2, 1922, note 4.

²⁵ Roskill, *op.cit.*, 289-290; Lord Kinross, *Atatürk* (London, 1966), 333; and Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 273-274.

²⁶ Henry Morgenthau, *International Drama* (London, 1929), 52.

²⁷ *DBFP*, Doc. 55. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 25, 1922.

²⁸ This information concerning the military posture of Greece had been requested by the British Prime Minister at a Cabinet meeting held on September 27 in the event of an outbreak of an Anglo-Turkish war at Chanak. *DBFP*, Doc. 72. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), September 29, 1922.

²⁹ Eleftherios Venizelos (1864-1936) was Prime Minister of Greece during most of the period 1910-1920. Under his leadership, Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars (1912-13) doubled in size. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, he acquired for Greece Thrace and the Smyrna district in Asia Minor. He went into exile after a disastrous electoral defeat in November 1920.

³⁰ The British were represented by General Harington, France by General Charpy with Franklin-Bouillon fluttering in the background and Italy by General Mombelli. Turkey was represented by General İsmet [İnönü] with several assistants. The Greek delegates, who arrive late, were General Mazarakis and Colonel Sariyannis.

³¹ *DBFP*, Doc. 81. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Rumbold (Constantinople), October 1, 1922.

³² France, Ministère des Relations Extérieures, Series "E", 1919-1929, *Levant: Turquie*. Vol. 60. Tel. 223-4-4 [E 304-1]. Charpy (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 6, 1922 and Tel. 14100-1413 [E 304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 8, 1922; and *DBFP*, Doc. 96. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922.

³³ *DBFP*, Doc. 96. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 6, 1922.

³⁴ Conversation of Kemal with Mougin, the French representative in Ankara in Tel. 317 [E 304-1]. Mougin (Angora) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 6, 1922.

³⁵ DBFP, Doc. 106-108. *British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting* ..., October 6, 1922, October 7, 1922 and October 7, 1922 respectively. Also Michael L. Smith, *Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-1922* (London, 1973), 318.

³⁶ Nicolson, *op.cit.*, 275-276.

³⁷ *Military Convention between the Allied Powers, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Greece* in E 320-1. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 10, 1922; and Turkey, No 1, Cmd 1570 (London, 1922).

³⁸ Walder, *op.cit.*, Ch.XVII and Henderson, *op.cit.*, 110-111.

³⁹ Psomiades, *op.cit.*, 232-234; DBFP, Doc 119. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 11, 1922; Tel 297 [304-1] Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922; Cebesoy, *op.cit.*, 83-101; Mears, *op.cit.*, 658-659; *The Speech*, 568-570; Bıyıklıoğlu, *op.cit.*, 450-454; and Yusuf Hikmet Bayer, *Türkiye devletinin dış siyasi [The Foreign Policy of the Turkish State]* (Istanbul, 1942), 117-118.

⁴⁰ Gregory Daphnis, *I Ellas metaxi dio polemon, 1923-1940 [Greece between Two World Wars, 1923-1940]*, Vol I (Athens, 1955), 26; I.A. Peponis, *Nicholas Plastiras, 1909-1945*, Vol I (Athens, 1947), 275; and Stylianos Gonatas, *Apomnimonevmata, 1897-1957 [Memoires, 1897-1957]* (Athens, 1958), 250.

⁴¹ DBFP, Doc. 86. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 2, 1922.

⁴² DBFP, Doc. 89. Curzon (Foreign Office) to Lindley (Athens), October 3, 1922; and Doc. 106. *British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting*..., October 6, 1922.

⁴³ Alexander Mazarakis-Ainian, *Mémoires* (Thessaloniki, 1979), 279.

⁴⁴ The Greek delegation did not participate in the talks at Mudanya and consequently did not confront the Turkish delegation. Presumably it had turned over this authority to the Powers when it asked them to arrange for an armistice. Mudanya was perhaps the first or an early example of "proximity talks", except that the Greek delegation had no say in the talks and was expected to accept all of the decisions made by the Allied generals.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 283-284; DBFP, Doc. 91. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 5, 1922.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Doc. 106, 107, 108. *British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting*.. October 6, 1922 and October 7, 1922. Also Doc. 109. Crowe (Foreign Office) to Hardinge (Paris), October 7, 1922.

⁴⁷ Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 293-295

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 296.

⁴⁹ For a copy of the original document and the signatories see Psomiades, *op.cit.*, 248-251

⁵⁰ Mazarakis-Ainian, *op.cit.*, 278.

⁵¹ DBFP., Doc. 122. *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922. See also *Venizelos archives*, 29. Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 12, 1922. It should be noted that both Pioncaré and Curzon claimed that Venizelos had accepted the 30 day limit in Paris, although Venizelos denied it. Lord Curzon minuted on October 12: "As it was M. Venizelos himself who suggested the month to the French, he must have been either very rash or very shortsighted." in note 6 to Doc. 122.

⁵² *Ibid.*, note 7.

⁵³ *Venizelos Archives*, 29, Venizelos (London) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 13, 1922.

⁵⁴ DBFP., Doc. Lindley (Athens) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 1922. See also Mazarakis-Ainian, *op. cit.*, 299 and Tel, 1499 [E340-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 12, 1922.

⁵⁵ Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974*, (Athens, 1993), 79.

⁵⁶ Büyüklöğlu, I. *op. cit.*, 470, 472; Cebesoy, *op. cit.*, 89ff; and Gonatas, *op. cit.*, 250-251.

⁵⁷ Interview in Tewhid-I-Efkâr, October 13, 1922, reported in No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922.

⁵⁸ Büyüklöğlu, *op. cit.*, 470, 472. According to the author the Turks made one big mistake in not demanding the 1913 frontier in their notes to the Allies of September 29 and October 4, 1922. *Ibid.*, 485-486.

⁵⁹ No. 297 [304-1]. Pellé (Constantinople) to Pioncaré (Paris), October 14, 1922.

⁶⁰ Alexandris, *op. cit.*, 82.

⁶¹ DBFP, Doc. 126. Rumbold (Constantinople) to Curzon (Foreign Office), October 16, 1922; and Doc. *Record by Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922.

⁶² Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*, 2nd edition (New York, 1970), xix-xx.

⁶³ M.L. Smith, *op. cit.*, 319.

⁶⁴ Ernest Hemingway, *Toronto Daily Star*, October 22, 1922.

⁶⁵ *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24318/24318. League of Nations, Reprt of Nansen, Part I, *Reciprocal Exchange of Racial Minorities between Greece and Turkey* (Geneva), November 15, 1922.

⁶⁶ DBFP., *Record of Sir E. Crowe of a conversation with M. Venizelos*, Foreign Office, October 12, 1922.

⁶⁷ *Nansen Papers*, R 1761 (1922), 48/24318/24318. Venizelos (London) to Nansen (Constantinople), October 13, 1922.

⁶⁸ *Venizelos Archives*, 30, Kanellopoulos (Athens) to Venizelos (London), October 15, 1922.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Venizelos (London) to the Greek Foreign Office, October 16, 1922.